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Abstract
Cryptojacking applications pose a serious threat to mobile devices. Due to the extensive computations, they deplete the
battery fast and can even damage the device. In this work, we make a step towards combating this threat. We collected
and manually verified a large dataset of Android mining apps. We analyzed the collected miners and identified how
they work, what are the most popular libraries and APIs used to facilitate their development, and what static features
are typical for this class of applications. We have also analyzed our dataset with VirusTotal. The majority of our
samples is considered malicious by at least one VirusTotal scanner, but 16 apps are not detected by any engine; and at
least 5 apks were not seen previously by the service.
Mining code could be obfuscated or fetched at runtime, and there are many confusing miner-related apps that actually
do not mine. Thus, static features alone are not sufficient for miner detection. We have collected a feature set of
dynamic metrics both for miners and unrelated benign apps, and built a machine learning-based tool for dynamic
detection. Our tool dubbed BRENNTDROID is able to detect miners with 95% of accuracy on our dataset.
1 Introduction
The recent wave of cryptocurrencies contributed to the debut of a new malware class called cryptominers, crypto-
jackers, or simply miners. After infecting a device, these applications start solving computationally hard puzzles that
support the cryptocurrency network, getting rewards for their work that are accumulated on the miner developer’s ac-
count. The ease of monetization and the anonymity factors enabled a quick growth of the mining malware. In 2017, the
skyrocketing price of cryptocurrencies caused by the enormous attention to these technologies has played a huge role
in the cryptojacking proliferation [10]. Not surprisingly, miners have quickly gained popularity and appeared among
the top security threats in 2018 [8, 34]. Security researchers have also paid attention, with many papers focusing on
browser-based mining [16, 11, 24, 30, 20, 31, 25, 29] and binary mining [26] appearing in the last year.
Due to the cryptocurrencies boom, end-user demand for mining applications has emerged. Prior to July 2018 every-
body could simply find mining applications on Google Play and attempt to generate a few coins on the mobile device.
Yet, as the smartphone-based mining no longer generates interesting profits for the benign user [31, 6], the interest to
these apps has significantly diminished. Now Google has removed mining applications from Google Play, but they are
still available on alternative markets. The “crash” of the cryptocurrency market in the end of 2018 forced the operation
of several mining services to shut down. For instance, recently the most popular service Coinhive has announced
discontinuation of its service [7]. Still, there are many alternatives, like CryptoLoot and JSEcoint, which are important
cyber threats today and that may further proliferate during the next crypto boom1,2.
The Android ecosystem itself is huge, comprising not only mobile devices but also wearable technology, TVs and
cars. It is therefore a lucrative target for adversaries due to the number of potential victims. Even smart TV appliances
1https://blog.checkpoint.com/2019/04/09/march-2019s-most-wanted-malware-cryptomining-still-
dominates-despite-coinhive-closure/
2https://blog.malwarebytes.com/cybercrime/2019/05/cryptojacking-in-the-post-coinhive-era/
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can now be infected with mining Android apps3. Recent security industry reports mention that mining capabilities are
being introduced to existing malware families or added into repackaged Android applications [8, 34, 10].
Indeed, mobile mining has certain advantages for the attackers. The mining code packaged as an application (app for
short) can be more persistent than website visits, by running in the background and when the user is not present. The
cost of creating and distributing a miner is negligible, given the ease of application repackaging [32] on Android and
the availability of mining libraries [20]. But miners are particularly dangerous for mobile devices. The extensive com-
putations performed during the mining process drain the battery and increase the temperature of the device, what can
render the device unusable. For example, a malicious family called Loapi causes the mobile devices to explode [34].
Therefore, there is an urgent need to study the Android miner phenomenon and to be able to detect such applications.
Contributions. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first systematic study of Android miners. We make the
following contributions.
• We have collected a large dataset of mining Android apps, which includes both Web-based and binary-based
cryptocurrency miners. As our focus is on the Android mining phenomenon, our dataset contains malicious
mining applications, and also honest miners that declare their mining activity upfront and could be solicited by
the users. We also include samples of non-mining applications that can confuse the basic detection approaches
(scam, wallet apps, etc.). Our dataset has been fully confirmed by manual analysis. We share our labelled
dataset and the metadata with the community4.
• We share insights on how (JavaScript) and binary Android miners work, how the mining code is injected,
and what are the most popular libraries/APIs for mining. Particularly, we have identified 8 common mining
libraries that are used in 671 mining applications.
• At least 5 miners from our dataset have previously never been uploaded to the popular VirusTotal service. We
have also found 16 apps, including both malicious and honest miners, that are not detected by any VirusTotal
scanner. Finally, we have ranked the antivirus engines at VirusTotal based on our dataset.
• Using our verified dataset as the ground truth, we performed dynamic analysis of the miners and compared the
results with randomly selected benign applications. We identified a set of dynamic metrics that are the most
efficient for accurate classification results, achieving 95% of accuracy and the AUC score of 0.988±0.009.
Based on our findings, we propose a tool called BRENNTDROID that can be used to detect miners dynamically
and to check if an app indeed mines cryptocurrencies (to combat scam).
2 Background
2.1 Android Applications
Android apps are distributed as archive files (.apk) that consist of the compiled Java code (.dex), the application
manifest (AndroidManifest.xml) containing the requested Android permissions and subscriptions to system events,
application resource files (e.g., Web-based resources such as .js and .html files), and native libraries (.so files).
The contents of .apk archives can be extracted with apktool [40] that, among other things, disassembles the .dex
files and transforms the disassembled Java classes into smali [33] – a low-level human-readable code representation
for Java code in Android platform.
Android has wide support for embedding Web-based content into its applications [21]. To achieve this, Android
apps support WebView – a technology that packages the basic functionality of web browsers (e.g., webpage rendering
and JavaScript) into a Java class that can be instantiated within an Android app and function similarly to a basic
web browser. In particular, this technology allows the developers of Android apps to embed Web content into the
application resources and interact with this content from the Java code and vice-versa.
1 WebView view = new WebView(this);
2 view.getSettings().setJavaScriptEnabled(true);
3 view.loadUrl(”https://google.com”);
4 view.loadUrl(”file://assets/page.html”);
Listing 1: WebView example
3http://blog.netlab.360.com/adb-miner-more-information-en/
4The dataset is available upon request at https://standash.github.io/android-miners-dataset/.
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The Android WebView is a subclass of the standard View class; its basic usage is shown in Listing 1: line 1 instantiates
an object of the WebView class, line 2 enables the execution of JavaScript code (disabled by default), and lines 3 and 4
load Web-based content into the WebView element. Note that not only the remote Web content can be loaded (line 3),
but also the resource files shipped together with the app (line 4).
1 public class NativeLibrary {
2 static {
3 System.loadLibrary(”native lib”);
4 }
5 public static native void doSmthng(int param);
6 }
Listing 2: Native library load example
1 String command = ”echo ’hello world’”;
2 Runtime localRuntime = Runtime.getRuntime();
3 localRuntime.exec(command);
Listing 3: Running a shell command from an Android app
Listing 2 shows how a native library can be called via the System.loadLibrary(...) interface: a Java wrapper
class has to be created in the Android app, where the .so library has to be loaded (line 3) and the corresponding native
methods declared (line 5). Listing 3 illustrates how a shell command can be executed from the Java code of an Android
app.
2.2 Android Cryptocurrency Miners
There exist two different approaches for mining cryptocurrencies on mobile devices: (1) the mining code is embedded
into a Web page that can be executed via a Web browser (we refer to them as javascript miners from now on); (2) the
mining code is packed into a binary that can be executed by a device (we will call them binary miners).
Both of the two mining approaches can be used to create either legitimate or illicit miners: the miners that belong
to the former category explicitly ask the user consent for mining, while the latter attempt to hide the fact that they
are mining. Also, the Web-based approach is typically used by the authors of malicious websites, while the binary
approach is favored by the authors of the traditional computer malware. It is important to stress, that both of these
approaches can be used within Android apps.
Software that mines cryptocurrencies typically rely upon drive-by mining services such as CoinHive5 that provide the
necessary infrastructure to mine cryptocurrencies such as Monero. This is particularly attractive for regular users,
as Monero can be mined using the CPU, instead of expensive GPU or other specialized hardware [20]. There exist
other “lightweight” cryptocurrencies, such as Litecoin and Ethereum that can be mined using the commodity hard-
ware. However, according to various reports, Monero significantly dominates them [8, 31, 11]. Also, to facilitate
cryptocurrency mining with comparatively weak hardware, mining service providers support creating mining pools,
when several devices combine their computational power to perform mining collectively. Therefore, when multiple
devices are combined into a single mining pool, mining the lightweight cryptocurrencies becomes profitable.
1 <script src=”https://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js”/>
2 <script>
3 var miner = new CoinHive.Anonymous(’SITE KEY’);
4 miner.start();
5 </script>
Listing 4: JavaScript miner initalization example
5https://krebsonsecurity.com/2018/03/who-and-what-is-coinhive/
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Listing 4 shows an example of an initialization script that, when embedded into a Web page, starts mining the Monero
cryptocurrency once that page is loaded. The “SITE KEY” needs to be substituted by the actual hash of the public site
key, which is connected to a certain cryptocurrency wallet tat willh receive the mining reward (the mining credentials).
In this example, the anonymous version of the CoinHive API has been used: any device that loads the script will
perform the mining, however the reward will be received only by the owner of the site key. Moreover, a wallet can
have multiple public site keys associated to it, and the “identity” of the wallet behind the miner cannot be inferred.
Such a simple mining initalization script is particularly popular in malicious website mining, as it is takes no effort for
embedding it, and provides anonymity [16].
1 ./minerd −−url stratum+tcp://eu.multipool.us:7777 −−userpass USERNAME:PASSWORD
Listing 5: Binary miner initalization example
Similarly, the script on Listing 4 can be invoked via the WebView element that supports loading Web pages and
JavaScript code in Android apps. Therefore, Android apps can use the same mechanism for mining crypto as regular
websites.
Listing 5 shows an example of invoking a binary miner from a shell (a MinerD6 executable). Android apps can also
include such miner executables and call them in this fashion by spawning a separate application process.
2.3 Our Terminology
To summarize, in this paper, we distinguish the following categories of cryptocurrency miners:
• Illicit miners are applications that try to perform stealth mining, i.e. they do not warn users explicitly about
the mining process, or selfish mining, i.e., they mine cryptocurrencies explicitly, but redirect the profits to the
attacker, not the user.
• Legitimate or benign miners are applications that both declare their mining activities and the user is the sole
benefactor of the mining process.
• Miner-related apps are applications that match many mining string patterns, but do not perform cryptocur-
rency mining (e.g., wallet apps).
• Scam miners are applications that pretend to perform mining activity, but do not actually perform any mining.
• Javascript miners are applications that include the web-based mining payload.
• Binary miners are applications that include binary mining payload.
3 Dataset Collection
We started by collecting several samples of Android miners. These applications have been found based on relevant
security industry blog posts and whitepapers, e.g., the SophosLabs report [34], that had explicitly mentioned the hashes
of illicit Android miners. We have also collected several miners from different Android app stores (Google Play7, F-
droid, etc.). This initial dataset has been used to create a set of strings and rules in the YARA notation8 indicating
mining payload in the code and metadata.
The initial set of miner-related strings and YARA rules contained only a few generic keywords, such as
“Monero”, “Litecoin”, generic mining API calls such as CoinHive.Anonymous(), CRLT.Anonymous(),
and CoinHive.User(), and domain names of the popular mining pools such as “us.litecoinpool.org”
“mine.xmrpool.net”. Yet, while such strings are already useful for finding some potential miners, they are in-
sufficient.
During already the first iterations of the dataset collection, we realized that a fully automatic search against many
diverse apps is inevitably prone to errors. This was unacceptable, as we aimed to build a reliable collection of apps
that could be used as the ground truth for detecting Android miners. Therefore, we manually analyzed each app with
at least a single match to the miner-related strings. We were looking for characteristics of the mining activity and the
6The source code is available at https://github.com/pooler/cpuminer
7This research had started before Google decided to remove all mining apps from Google Play on 07/27/2018.
8http://virustotal.github.io/yara/
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intended interactions with user: (a) the mining code (e.g., the code that initializes mining and the mining libraries);
(b) how the mining can be triggered by a user (by interacting with an app in a certain way or by simply launching its
main activity); (c) supported cryptocurrencies; (d) the declared functionality of the app and whether it tries to “hide”
its intentions. We also aimed to find more string patterns that can be used to extend our sample of miners. Once we
had found a new pattern, we added it to our set of miner-related strings, and re-ran the string search against the apps
that had no previous matches and a new batch of apps that we have been downloading.
To summarize, we performed many iterations of the following steps: (1) find a large sample of potential Android
miners using string search, and download them; (2) perform a manual analysis to find the evidence that these apps are
miners, and discard false-positives; (3) update the search strings used at the step (1) with new patterns discovered
at the step (2). We repeated these steps multiple times, increasing our dataset of Android miners and improving its
quality.
3.1 Main Application Sources
To find a large set of potential miners, we used the popular platforms VirusTotal9 and Koodous10. Services provided
by these platforms are quite different, but they both allow to search for Android apps that match specific criteria, and
to download them. Below, we briefly introduce these platforms and describe how we utilized them.
VirusTotal checks user-submitted binaries (including Android apps) against several popular anti-virus engines. Cur-
rently, VirusTotal allows not only to perform scans in the black-box manner, but also to search over the dynamic data
of apps (e.g., the URLs that apps try to connect to), and to perform string pattern search over its application database.
We first used the Private API11 of VirusTotal to search and download the apps from our original dataset by their
hashes, and to collect their metadata. From this metadata we extracted the information about the malware families that
these apps potentially correspond to, and manually compiled a list of the families related to cryptocurrency mining (as
reported by the anti-virus engines used by VirusTotal). Next, we used the file search functionality12 of VirusTotal, and
downloaded all Android apps that have been recently detected by at least one of the anti-virus engines and belong to
at least one malware family from our list. Additionally, we checked the dynamic information of apps against a set of
known miner-related strings (e.g., mining pools and domain names listed in [20, 16]), and downloaded the matching
apps as well.
Koodous is collaborative platform that allows to download Android apps, analyze them, and share the analysis results.
Koodous performs static and dynamic analyses of apps using the state-of-art Android analysis tools like Androguard13
and the Cuckoo sandbox14. Users can also write custom YARA rules15 for finding and downloading the matching
apps. We used this functionality to create our own YARA rulesets for searching and downloading potential Android
miners from Koodous, based on the set of miner-related strings we identified during our manual analysis over the
sample retrieved from VirusTotal (see Section 3.2). We also searched for the YARA rules that had been already written
by the community to detect miner apps, and incorporated them into our ruleset as well.
3.2 Manual Analysis
To confirm that an app is a cryptocurrency miner we performed its thorough manual analysis. During the manual
analysis we treated every app as follows: we decompiled it with apktool, matched the set of miner-related strings
against the decompiled files, and examined the app starting from the files where we found matches. We paid special
attention to the resource files with extensions .html, .js, and .xml, native libraries (.so), and executable files
shipped with the app. Once we had located the mining initialization code (e.g., a JavaScript code fragment that inserts
the mining credentials into a mining library and starts the mining, or a smali code fragment that calls a native mining
library) and/or the mining code (e.g., a library that implements the mining functionality), we looked for the entry
points in the app that triggered the mining. For example, we found at least 22 cases when the mining initialization
code is placed directly into the MainActivity class, or located in a subclass of the Application class – in such cases, the
mining starts immediately upon the app startup. While performing this process, we have identified and collected other
static indicators that suggest that the app under question is a miner. We describe them in more detail in Section 5.1.
9https://www.virustotal.com/
10https://koodous.com/
11https://www.virustotal.com/en/documentation/private-api
12https://www.virustotal.com/intelligence/help/file-search/
13https://github.com/androguard/androguard
14https://cuckoosandbox.org/
15https://yara.readthedocs.io/en/v3.4.0/writingrules.html
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Using the above static indicators (see Section 5.1 for more details), we have downloaded in total 17159 Android apps
using both VirusTotal and Koodous. After the manual analysis step, we obtained the dataset of 728 Android miners
(we describe the dataset in Section 4).
4 Dataset Description
Javascript vs binary miners. Table 1 lists the percentages of Android apps in our dataset: the proportions of
javascript and binary miners in the sample, and the numbers of illicit miners among them. We also identified a small
subset of miner-related apps that are similar to miners, but do not contain any mining code, and can be points of
confusion for automatic miner detection approaches (we discuss them in more detail further in this Section). The
distribution of apps in Table 1 suggests that the most popular way to create mining apps is with JavaScript, and that
the majority of the miners in our sample are illicit (614 illicit miners).
Category # samples (%)
JavaScript 594 (77.95%)
JavaScript illicit 563 (73.88%)
Binary 134 (17.59%)
Binary illicit 51 (6.69%)
Miner-related 34 (4.46%)
Total 762
Table 1: The distribution of Android apps in our sample
Android permission #Miners (%)
android.permission.INTERNET 728 (100.00%)
android.permission.ACCESS NETWORK STATE 374 (51.37%)
android.permission.WAKE LOCK 351 (48.21%)
android.permission.WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE 300 (41.21%)
android.permission.RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED 258 (35.44%)
android.permission.READ EXTERNAL STORAGE 203 (27.88%)
com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE 149 (20.47%)
android.permission.ACCESS WIFI STATE 138 (18.96%)
android.permission.VIBRATE 135 (18.54%)
android.permission.READ PHONE STATE 128 (17.58%)
Table 2: Top 10 Android permissions used by miners
Android system event #Miners (%)
android.intent.action.BOOT COMPLETED 536 (73.63%)
android.intent.action.QUICKBOOT POWERON 169 (22.18%)
android.intent.action.MY PACKAGE REPLACED 161 (22.11%)
com.android.vending.INSTALL REFERRER 159 (21.84%)
com.google.android.c2dm.intent.RECEIVE 146 (20.05%)
com.htc.intent.action.QUICKBOOT POWERON 122 (16.76%)
android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY CHANGE 95 (13.05%)
android.intent.action.ACTION POWER DISCONNECTED 84 (11.26%)
android.intent.action.ACTION POWER CONNECTED 84 (11.26%)
android.intent.action.BATTERY LOW 68 ( 8.52%)
Table 3: Top 10 system event subscriptions by miners
Top Android permissions and system events used. Permissions and system events subscriptions are widely used
as features to detect Android malware [2, 36], and it is interesting to see whether the miner population uses the same
permissions and listens to the same system events as generic malware.
Wang et al. [39], Jiang and Zhou [19], and Feldman et al. [12] have previously compared Android malware and
benign apps in terms of requested permissions. Table 2 lists the top 10 requested Android permissions across our
sample of miners. It is evident that the only permission needed for Android miners to properly function is the
android.permission.INTERNET, which is the only permission requested by 286 miners. This permission is not
considered dangerous anymore, and is granted by the Android system without user consent [43]. Comparing the
statistics in the works of Wang et al. [39] and Jiang and Zhou[19] with Table 2, we can conclude that miners generally
do not request permissions that are very prevalent in malicious samples only, e.g., READ SMS.
Table 3 lists the top 10 most occurring system event subscriptions, else called filtered intents. Most of the miners have
subscribed to android.intent.action.BOOT COMPLETED, which means that they will attempt to resume their work
as soon as the device has been booted. This system event is highly indicative of malicious apps [45]. We see also that
a significant number of miners tries to monitor the battery consumption and the network connection status.
Only 39 miners from our sample can be characterized as generic malware with respect to their behavior, while 30 of
these miners are actively forcing users to allow them administrative privileges, and monitor whether they receive the
role of the device administrator, and whether users try to revoke this role.
Mining libraries. 8 third-party mining libraries have been identified in our sample. Table 4 lists these libraries and
the number of apps from our sample that rely on them. In total, these libraries are used by 671 miners. We could not
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Library URL #Apps
CoinHive Android SDK https://github.com/theapache64/coin_hive_android_sdk 437
CoinHive API https://coinhive.com/lib/coinhive.min.js 139
CPUMiner https://github.com/pooler/cpuminer 42
https://github.com/mdelling/cpuminer-android
MinerD https://github.com/MiniblockchainProject/Minerd 26
CGMiner https://github.com/reorder/cgminer_keccak 17
https://github.com/Max-Coin/cgminer
XMRig https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig 6
Authedmine API https://authedmine.com/media/miner.html 3
C0nw0nk https://github.com/C0nw0nk/CoinHive 1
UNKNOWN 57
Table 4: Third-party mining libraries used by the miners from our sample
identify the origin of the mining code for the remaining 57 miners. This was either due to the fact that they might
be using a custom mining library that we could not identify (mostly the case for legitimate miners), or the library has
been heavily changed and obfuscated so that we could not match it to any of the original libraries (mostly the case for
illicit miners).
Notably, for javascript miners, the plain JavaScript CoinHive API16 library is not the most used one: 437 miners
integrate the CoinHive Android SDK library, which is a wrapper that provides convenient JavaScript-to-Java bindings
for the CoinHive API in Android apps. At the same time, we found that the Authedmine17 API has been used only
in 3 cases. We identified the usage of several desktop cryptomining software projects in binary miners: CPUMiner,
CGMiner, XMRig, and MinerD. These projects have been specifically compiled for Android as libraries/executables
by the authors of the miners. We found several versions of CPUMiner and CGMiner available on GitHub18 used by
the miners.
We observed that in many cases the third-party libraries have been used “as is”, however in some cases the original
library is changed by the authors of miners. For instance, the original CoinHive Android SDK library has had large
modifications in at least 64 illicit miners from our sample. In all these cases the changes were non-significant to the
core functionality of the library (perhaps, made only for evading detection): e.g., package name has been changed,
several classes not related to mining have been removed, variable names have been changed, etc. For example, in
8 of these cases, the “engine.html” file, which is the core of the library, has been totally unchanged (we checked
the hashes of the files against the original file provided by the library). In 56 cases the “engine.html” file has been
renamed into “coinhive.html” and modified, yet the original mining functionality was intact.
Overall, these observations favor the intuition that, given the small hash rate for smartphone-based mining [31], the
malicious actors would not spend resources on implementing the mining functionality from scratch, but rather use the
libraries that are already available.
By looking at the used third-party libraries and the code of the miners from our sample, we were able to determine
that 586 miners target the Monero cryptocurrency, 5 miners target Ethereum, 5 miners target Litecoin, and 3 miners
have been created to test the capability of mobile devices for mining Bitcoin. 91 binary miners in our sample rely on
third-party mining libraries that can be used to mine multiple cryptocurrencies (Monero, Litecoin, Ethereum, Bitcoin,
and others).
Mining campaigns. Similarly to previous works Konoth et al. [20] and Hong et al. [16], we tried to identify the
mining campaigns by grouping the sets of miners that are likely to share the same origin, and therefore may share the
benefits from the mined cryptocurrency. As most of the miners from our sample reuse the same third-party mining
libraries, it is difficult to identify the same origin by looking at the similar code patterns in the apps. Therefore,
we assume that two miners belong to the same campaign only if they share the same mining credentials used for
authentication with the mining services (e.g., the cryptocurrency wallet id and/or CoinHive site key).
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the sizes of the mining campaigns found within our sample. Overall, we found 94
unique mining campaigns, with the largest campaign enclosing 342 miners, two smaller campaigns enclosing 56 and
24 miners respectively, and 91 small campaigns of 10 miners and less. The rest of the apps are benign miners that did
not contain any mining credentials, or illicit miners for which we could not retrieve these credentials. Therefore, we
could not consider such miners to be a part of a mining campaign.
16An example of its usage is shown in Listing 4
17This API has been released by CoinHive as well. Unlike the original mining API, it requires explicit user consent for mining.
18https://github.com
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CAMPAIGN COUNT
CAMPAIGN1: 342 miners 342
CAMPAIGN2: 56 miners 56
CAMPAIGN3: 24 miners 24
CAMPAIGNS4-94: 10 miners and less 155
CAMPAIGN1: 342 miners
CAMPAIGN2: 56 miners
CAMPAIGN3: 24 miners
CAMPAIGNS4-94: 10 miners and less
Figure 1: The sizes of mining campaigns
At this stage we cannot conclude whether the small mining campaigns that we found are indeed small “in the wild”, as
this requires further large-scale data collection and analysis. However, the two relatively large campaigns suggest that
in the wild there may be many Android apps created or, more likely, repackaged by the same malicious developer that
is actively trying to maximize her mining profit. Indeed, it is relatively inexpensive to repackage an already existing
app and insert only the mining code. We have seen many examples that support this conclusion, see Section 5.
When searching for the mining credentials used in the biggest mining campaign that we identified, we found that
a security researcher has already reported19 this mining campaign. Still, our sample contains more apps than it was
originally reported (342 versus 291). Moreover, at least 24 of apps from our sample that belong to this campaign do not
share similar code (unlike the apps seen by the researcher), suggesting that the campaign might be even bigger in the
wild. In our sample there are another 64 miners that correspond to 17 mining campaigns which mining credentials have
been reported in whitepapers and blogposts by other researchers. Yet, we have collected 173 miners that correspond
to 76 campaigns that have not been previously reported. In particular, the second largest illicit campaign shown on
Figure 1 is has not been reported before.
Miner-related apps. We have also encountered 34 Android apps that we refer to as miner-related. While these apps
do not perform any cryptocurrency mining, they are riddled with keywords, links, and mining credentials relevant to
the real mining apps. Such apps may pose additional challenges for automated miner detection approaches, and it is
therefore important to consider their presence “in the wild”. We include these apps as a separate category in the dataset
we have built, because they are valuable confusing data points. Below we briefly describe them.
12 of these apps have useful functionality: e.g., they either monitor the value of cryptocurrencies, or serve as cryp-
tocurrency wallets, or simply ask for donations in cryptocurrencies (for apps of the latter case we found a match for a
cryptocurrency wallet). These applications can serve as confusion points since various static indicators would suggest
the presence of mining code (see Section 5.1). The rest of 22 miner-related apps are scam. They do not have any
useful functionality, and claim to be legitimate mining apps. Their monetization comes from either showing paid
ads, or tricking their users into paying for an “upgraded” version of the app: for example, the “basic” version may
claim that it does not support transferring the mined funds, until a sufficient amount of a cryptocurrency is mined. In
particular, 2 of these apps employ a trick to improve their ratings: from the start they promise the user 50,000 Satoshis
(0.0005 Bitcoins) for “free” if the user rates the app. Such apps correspond to another possible source of confusion
for automated detection approaches: while, an app claims it is a cryptocurrency miner and should be immediately
considered as a positive data point (e.g., by classification approaches from the area of machine learning), they neither
contain the mining code, nor manifest the runtime behavior typical to the mining apps (see Section 5.2).
Table 5 summarizes top 10 permissions requested by miner-related applications, and Table 6 shows top 10 system
events that miner-related apps subscribe to. The requested permissions and monitored system events in these apps
largely coincide with the statistics reported for the mining sample in Tables 2&3. This further shows that lightweight,
keyword-based detection approaches for miners may produce many false-positives. At the same time, permissions
and system events may indicate that miner-related apps, especially of the scam type, are supplied by malicious actors.
Yet, our sample of miner-related applications in the dataset is relatively small; thus a larger investigation of a larger
population of such applications is warranted.
19https://twitter.com/fs0c131y/status/950082654891802630
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Android permission # Apps (%)
android.permission.INTERNET 34 (100.00%)
android.permission.ACCESS NETWORK STATE 34 (100.00%)
android.permission.WAKE LOCK 22 (64.70%)
com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE 19 (55.88%)
android.permission.ACCESS WIFI STATE 15 (44.11%)
android.permission.WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE 13 (38.23%)
android.permission.CAMERA 12 (35.29%)
android.permission.RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED 11 (32.35%)
android.permission.VIBRATE 9 (26.47%)
android.permission.ACCESS COARSE LOCATION 8 (23.52%)
Table 5: Top 10 permissions in miner-related apps
Android system event # Apps (%)
com.android.vending.INSTALL REFERRER 19 (55.88%)
android.intent.action.BOOT COMPLETED 16 (47.05%)
com.google.android.c2dm.intent.RECEIVE 16 (47.05%)
android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY CHANGE 7 (20.58%)
android.intent.action.QUICKBOOT POWERON 5 (14.70%)
android.intent.action.PACKAGE ADDED 5 (14.70%)
android.intent.action.ACTION POWER CONNECTED 4 (11.76%)
android.intent.action.ACTION POWER DISCONNECTED 4 (11.76%)
android.intent.action.MY PACKAGE REPLACED 4 (11.76%)
android.net.wifi.WIFI STATE CHANGED 4 (11.76%)
Table 6: Top 10 system events used by miner-related apps
4.1 Examples of Mining Applications
The screens in Figures 2a and 2b demonstrate examples of two mining applications. The first app is an illicit miner20.
It looks like an app that was created just for fun and provides very basic functionality playing a funny song. However,
invisibly it mines the Monero cryptocurrency in a hidden Web browser. The second example is a legal miner created
specifically for mining Bitcoin on ARM devices21. In this miner users need to configure their own mining credentials
and run the miner. It is a binary miner that exploits a standalone executable minerd. Both apps have been previously
hosted on Google Play.
(a) Illicit miner (b) Legal miner
Figure 2: Screenshots of miner apps
4.2 VirusTotal Analysis Results
We checked each sample from our mining dataset using the VirusTotal service. Using their API, we downloaded
the VirusTotal extended analysis reports for each app in our dataset, obtaining the latest report version for the time
of writing. If a report was not found, i.e., a sample had not been uploaded to VirusTotal before, we submitted the
application on our own.
20SHA256 a3f376a5c74e1fe112786b4ad450a6b3976226e2164b106653483522adf6bced
21SHA256 727cd092ed478453c2f19d180e1aa8fd22e43dc9cf24772c5ae2ca36cf9dbc4e
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We were the first who found and uploaded at least 5 samples to VirusTotal22. Among previously seen samples, an app
from our dataset was checked by VirusTotal at the earliest in October 2013, while the most recent one was uploaded
in March, 2019.
All applications from our dataset have been checked by at least 1 out of 77 antivirus products aggregated on the
platform. Figure 3 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) representing the amount of antivirus scanners
that detected each application from our dataset. On average, a sample in our list is marked as malicious by 22 scanner.
Maximum, a sample in our dataset is detected by 43 different scanners. This shows that even old, well-known samples
are not recognized by all scanners.
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Figure 3: CDF of positive detection by VirusTotal scanners
In Figure 3, we can spot three high steps at 3, 10 and 35 detections (63, 57 and 59 new samples correspondingly). These
steps could have appeared because some scanners have similar detection engines, or they share antivirus databases.
Indeed, Table 7 proves this assumption. It shows that the results of some scanner pairs are either identical or highly
correlated.
Scanner 1 Scanner 2 Correlation
AntiVir Commtouch 1.000
ByteHero 1.000
ByteHero Commtouch 1.000
Agnitum Commtouch 1.000
Commtouch Norman 1.000
ByteHero Norman 1.000
TACHYON nProtect 1.000
Agnitum Norman 1.000
AntiVir 1.000
AntiVir Norman 1.000
Agnitum ByteHero 1.000
AVG Avast 0.997
Kaspersky ZoneAlarm 0.990
BitDefender Emsisoft 0.984
GData 0.927
Emsisoft GData 0.922
BitDefender MAX 0.894
Emsisoft MAX 0.886
GData MAX 0.862
Arcabit BitDefender 0.857
Table 7: Top 20 highly correlated scanner pairs
Interestingly, 16 miners are not detected by any antivirus product. Table 8 reports SHA256 hashes of these miners and
the accompanied data that we extracted from VirusTotal reports. We determined 10 out of these 16 apps as legitimate
miners, and 6 of them as illicit. The miners from this table are not new: the oldest is dated back to 2013. However,
even the illicit miners among these apps are still not recognized as malicious or unwanted. For 4 apps this can be
explained by the fact that the mining script is stored in the encrypted form and is being decrypted at runtime, and 2
22We have not collected this statistics from the start, therefore, we can confirm only 5 cases.
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of the undetected apps use obfuscation. Based on these results, we cannot not draw firm conclusions whether mining
functionality is deemed malicious by VirusTotal scanners, as 10 legitimate miners are also detected as malware. It
could be also that our miners contain some other malicious payloads, even though our analysis have not revealed such
evidence for legitimate miners (but there were “also-malicious” illicit miners).
SHA256 Illicit First seen Last seen Amount of Amount of
date date submissions unique sources
aa200375c8422f3e034b122aa45e59a289b6c356b2301c4651189c27a895d9b0 6 2013-10-13 2015-03-14 4 2
76ae303c82d8233414694ff803c2a22bd82dc1ff1bab1341f9932a238b6b0efc 6 2017-07-28 2017-07-28 1 1
f8f936810980d14ab41abb91d4fb0bba32c083e6846623d4320ea45053e8ea6d 6 2017-09-27 2017-09-27 1 1
d735cf3732d00ce43d1a36bc77123770d5d611f09d39b8576e3698a9a2ebda87 6 2017-12-01 2017-12-01 1 1
c491cbabb604a59c99e5be0e1808f43e1d21b94be524c4d1c759c8bbbd452509 4 2018-01-09 2018-01-09 1 1
609941fdf62a6f9d186a7714bd4238e0d2c531badd96a69dbb2dce2b4f1d5248 6 2018-02-28 2018-07-18 8 6
be11f2929b4383f1bcf020c8d7d8b4ef0172c5c5a4e468271ebb87f4b14db876 6 2018-03-02 2019-04-24 4 3
c471ca1989d7fc7662ea3ba5bf0bcc79d8790fe4770acaaabd10dafadb7ee362 6 2018-05-03 2018-05-03 2 2
630cf7f1728e8a592aa016171be1f7852f70baaed5267398417f8d91b9d14acb 6 2018-05-29 2018-09-08 2 2
f61e31ee2f27f2815e7720cad5920b750d10e01788cd78f7fbd81ba1c31dfeb3 4 2018-07-13 2018-07-13 1 1
7acb35a690d02a34a404cae9ccd3f9b25558e43fd143514c7b42f225aa3663a3 6 2018-08-05 2018-10-13 2 2
17b56ef3a43c6cd4245113ada9a9ff0364754fc6947d05e9f9acb8e6630f9d27 6 2018-08-23 2018-08-23 1 1
2e5ba00cc3caa0a4801f2b0580829cee0577e4b05719e86ea7e5690c961d5dae 4 2019-01-30 2019-01-30 1 1
33db4abf2526b4bda22559e41052ea12362c25e96fd0ebd49becd470694e57de 4 2019-02-02 2019-04-05 2 2
cb6546a785af3aa2dfee434e25e66ca8691e56909a64e3e317a91fb4e2d5bd1b 4 2019-02-10 2019-02-10 1 1
ec8433cd5a06aaafe251361ec304dbc438272a5fef49cf7c5c45a63caecff375 4 2019-03-02 2019-03-02 1 1
Table 8: Samples not detected by the VirusTotal scanners
Figure 4a shows how many times a sample from our dataset has been submitted to VirusTotal. On average, this value
is around 1.85. Indeed, 558 samples have been uploaded to VirusTotal only once, while the most frequently submitted
sample has been uploaded 26 times.
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(b) Distribution of new submissions to VirusTotal
Figure 4: Sample submissions to VirusTotal
Using the information on the date when a sample was submitted to VirusTotal first time, we evaluated if our dataset
is relatively new. To achieve this goal, we aggregated the samples by months when they have been first spotted on
VirusTotal. Figure 4b shows the timeline when the apps from our list were submitted to VirusTotal for the first time.
Several interesting observations can be derived from this figure. First, we can see that our dataset is relatively new:
the majority of applications have been first spotted on VirusTotal in 2018. Second, the figure shows that before the
last quarter of 2017 there were a few submissions of new miners, while in the beginning of 2018 we observe huge
spike. This phenomenon can be explained by cryptocurrencies popularity in general. Indeed, before 2017 the interest
to the cryptocurrencies was mostly driven by niche experts and geeks. However, in 2017 the price of Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies started to grow exponentially. This attracted the attention of malware developers, who started to
explore this market. Clearly, a miner is a very attractive type of malicious application because it directly earns money
for the developer, while almost no efforts need to be spent on its preparation and distribution through repackaging. Not
surprisingly, in the end of 2017 antivirus companies started to consider Android miners as harmful applications [37, 8].
We have also ranked the VirusToal scanners according to their ability to detect mining applications on our the dataset
of manually confirmed miners and their detection results. We assigned +1 point to each true positive and -1 point to
each false negative; if a scanner failed to scan a sample or VirusTotal does not have the data, we gave 0 points. The
final score is calculated as sum of these points. Table 9 reports the top 10 VirusTotal scanners based on this score.
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Note that Table 9 shows the rating based only on our dataset consisting on the samples from one class (miners). This
could introduce a deviation in our ranking because a scanner that marks all submitted files as malicious would take
the first place in our ranking. To make a more fair list, we would need to get also the list of benign applications and
test the scanners on them. However, a comprehensive evaluation of the VirusTotal scanners is out of our scope for this
work.
Scanner Final True False Failed /
score positives negatives no data
Sophos 514 621 107 0
CAT-QuickHeal 478 603 125 0
DrWeb 474 601 127 0
ESET-NOD32 394 561 167 0
Ikarus 346 512 166 50
Avira 285 505 220 3
McAfee 266 497 231 0
SymantecMobileInsight 256 408 152 168
ZoneAlarm 254 489 235 4
Kaspersky 252 489 237 2
Table 9: Top 10 VirusTotal scanners evaluated on our dataset
5 Detecting Android Miners
5.1 Static Indicators
In this Section we describe the heuristics that we identified and used when performing manual analysis of potential
miner apps (Section 3). These heuristics can be used as static indicators for pinpointing potential Android miners
across large amounts of apps.
Static heuristics. As we describe in Section 4, the vast majority of our miners use third-party mining libraries, and
often the code of these libraries is used without any changes. Therefore, finding the presence of the code of these
libraries will indicate a potential miner with high degree of certainty. For libraries written in JavaScript we take note
of the distinctive code patterns and strings. For libraries written in Java (e.g., CoinHive Android SDK shown in Table
4) we take note of distinctive components of the library such as package names, classes, and smali code patterns.
For native libraries and executables we take note of their filename and SHA256 hash code, as well as specific string
patterns that can be present inside them. For instance, most of the native mining libraries listed in Table 4 had a
distinctive help menu that lists the available mining parameters and settings. When we see an unknown binary file
that could be a mining library we can obtain its hexdump using command line tools such as xxd and compare string
patterns inside the binary file against the string patterns retrieved from known mining libraries. While such approach
cannot beat sophisticated obfuscation techniques, it may be still helpful to uncover a large set of miners where the
library (or its parts) is used as is. We find that this simple heuristic is quite powerful, allowing us to find many miners
that were difficult to spot otherwise.
We illustrate this heuristic with the CoinHive Android SDK library (Table 4). The library implements a convenient
Java wrapper around the CoinHive JavaScript API. Thus, the library can be added directly to an Android project as
a dependency, and a CoinHive miner instance can be created and launched from within the Java code, as shown in
Listing 6. The CoinHive Java class contains JavaScript-to-Java bindings to the file called “engine.html” located
in the “resources/” folder of the SDK. This file includes the plain CoinHive API JavaScript library (Table 4).
Therefore, javascript miners that rely on this library can be relatively easily detected by searching for known code
patterns specific for the mining library (e.g., the smali code that corresponds to the miner initialization code shown in
Listing 6), and/or for the code patterns present in the “engine.html” file.
The miner initialization code for Web-based mining services, such as CoinHive API, is typically inserted into
benign HTML/JavaScript resources of an app, and is loaded into an Android WebView UI element through the
“WebView.loadUrl(...)” call – this is quite similar to how the browser-based mining works in the Web [20]
(the Android-specific code looks similar to the example we made on Listing 1). In some cases, the JavaScript mining
code is stored as a string constant inside the smali code and is passed directly into a WebView element.
The authors of binary miners typically place the mining libraries (e.g., “libcpuminer.so”) or standalone executables
(e.g., “minerd” ELF executable) under the “res/raw/” or the “assets/” folder of an app archive. These libraries
are invoked either via the Android “System.loadLibrary(...)” interface, or by spawning separate application
processes for executables (the Android-specific code looks similar to the examples we made in Listing 2 and 3).
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1 public class App extends Application {
2 @Override
3 public void onCreate() {
4 super.onCreate();
5
6 CoinHive.getInstance()
7 .init(”YOUR−SITE−KEY”) // mining credentials
8 .setNumberOfThreads(4) // CPU threads
9 .setThrottle(0.2) // CPU throttle
10 }
11 }
Listing 6: CoinHive Android SDK initialization example
We also looked for the mining credentials (e.g., cryptocurrency wallet and site key identifiers) passed into the mining
initialization code – the presence of known mining credentials in apps immediately indicates that they are most likely
miners. In general, we observed that illicit miners contain the mining credentials somewhere in the app code (577
illicit miners from our sample have hardcoded mining credentials). Therefore, to significantly reduce the effort of
quickly pinpointing new miners we built a collection of such identifiers.
We used several heuristics to retrieve the mining credentials. We observed that many javascript and binary miners
share similar miner initialization code patterns. Therefore, after known third-party library code has been located, it
is easier to identify the code that initializes the mining and recover the mining credentials (this can also help when
the initialization code is obfuscated to a certain degree). For example, in case of the CoinHive Android SDK library,
we looked at the values of the parameters passed either to the CoinHive Java class (Listing 6), or the parameters
passed directly into the “engine.html” file23. We also used regular expressions based on the patterns of mining
credentials for various cryptocurrencies. However, these regular expressions yielded too many irrelevant strings: for
instance, we often found strings like “provideSHealthSyncedWorkoutsDAO”, while we have been searching for strings
like “NDMtBC8iLiUkEjUzKC8mYSQzMy4zYXxh”. Therefore, we calculated the Shannon Entropy metric [22] for
such strings and only kept the strings for which this metric exceeded a certain threshold (we empirically selected the
value of 4.33). We checked the retrieved mining credentials and added them to our string search, and found many
more mining apps using this heuristic.
Finally, to search through the apps for which we could not easily find known mining credentials or code patterns, we
used potential mining domains24 and simple keywords such as miner, bitcoin, stratum, monero, hashrate, etc.
While the keyword search allows to find new previously unseen miners (which helped us a lot at the initial stages of
our work), using it alone is prone to large amounts of false-positives. For example, many non-miner apps that we
encountered contain an adblock functionality that actively tries to block known cryptocurrency mining domains (and
thus, there will be a match to our miner domain list).
Evasion techniques. We found cases when illicit miners apply various evasion techniques and their combination to
avoid detection: the code fragments that initialize the mining process and contain the mining credentials may be not
shipped with the miner app itself, or this code can be encrypted within an app and only be decrypted at runtime.
For example, we found cases when an illicit miner loads the mining credentials from a remote server upon the appli-
cation startup. The download link is present within the code of the miner, but it has been obfuscated. However, when
we launched the app in the Android emulator, the logcat utility allowed us to see which link the app is trying to
connect to, and that it downloads a JSON file. Upon further inspection of the file25, it became clear that it contained
the mining credentials. We provide a screenshot of this file in Figure 5. In this figure, we can see the settings for
the mining script, including the wallet address, the preferred mining pool, and some configurations that allow to start
mining when the device is charging and not charging. By examining the public GitHub repository26 where the link
is hosted, we found several other files that had similar structure but different mining wallets. We added these wallets
23E.g., “file:///android_asset/engine.html?site_key=...”
24We compiled a large list of known mining domains from various sources such as https://github.com/hoshsadiq/
adblock-nocoin-list/blob/master/nocoin.txt.
25The link is still available at the time of writing: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cryptominesetting/setting/
master/setting.txt
26https://github.com/cryptominesetting/setting
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to our miner-related strings, however we have not found any apps that use them yet. This could be due to some other
ways of hiding the mining payload that we are not yet aware of, or possibly the owner of this repository is creating
illicit cryptocurrency miners for other application platforms (e.g., Google Chrome extensions).
{ "chEnable":true,
  "maEnable":false,
  "alternativeMine":false,
  "secondaryAlternativeMine":false,
  "chargingOn":true,
  "chargingOff":true,
  "screenOff":true,
  "screenOn":true,
  
  "ma":0.8,
  "ch":0.7,
  
  "alternativeLink":"http://crymore.ga",
  "secondaryAlternativeLink":"",
  
  "nativeMinerPool":"pool.supportxmr.com:3333",
  "wallet":"44V8ww9soyFfrivJDfcgmT2gXCFPQDyLFXyS7mEo2xTSaf7NFXAL9usGxrko3aKauBGcwZaF1duCWc2p9eDNt9H7Q8iB7gy",
  "nativeMinerThread":1,
  
  "versionConfig":{
    "7":{
      "chEnable":true,
      "maEnable":false,
      "alternativeMine":false,
      "secondaryAlternativeMine":false,
      "chargingOn":true,
      "chargingOff":true,
      "screenOff":true,
      "screenOn":true,
      "ma":0.8,
      "ch":0.7,
      "alternativeLink":"http://crymore.ga",
      "secondaryAlternativeLink":"",
      "wallet":"44V8ww9soyFfrivJDfcgmT2gXCFPQDyLFXyS7mEo2xTSaf7NFXAL9usGxrko3aKauBGcwZaF1duCWc2p9eDNt9H7Q8iB7gy",
      "nativeMinerPool":"pool.supportxmr.com:3333",
      "nativeMinerThread":1
    },
    "8":{
      "chEnable":true,
      "maEnable":false,
      "alternativeMine":false,
      "secondaryAlternativeMine":false,
      "chargingOn":true,
      "chargingOff":true,
      "screenOff":true,
      "screenOn":true,
      "ma":0.8,
      "ch":0.7,
      "alternativeLink":"http://crymore.ga",
      "secondaryAlternativeLink":"",
      "wallet":"44V8ww9soyFfrivJDfcgmT2gXCFPQDyLFXyS7mEo2xTSaf7NFXAL9usGxrko3aKauBGcwZaF1duCWc2p9eDNt9H7Q8iB7gy",
      "nativeMinerPool":"pool.supportxmr.com:3333",
      "nativeMinerThread":1 
}
   }
}
Figure 5: Illicit miner configuration served online
Another approach for hiding miner credentials that we observed is as follows. The application resources contain an
.html resource file with the link to the CoinHive mining script, yet, there seem to be no code that initializes the
mining process. Initially we thought that such apps had no mining capabilities. Yet, upon closer inspection of other
links embedded into the html pages, we identified a set of links to some JavaScript code located at suspicious websites.
Several of these links27 contained the code we have been looking for (shown in Listing 7). Therefore, for improving
the results of static Android miner detection, it is important to download and inspect the remote resources, such as
external links.
1 var miner = new CoinHive.Anonymous(’...’);
2 miner.start();
Listing 7: Remote CoinHive initialization script example
27The link is still available at the time of writing: https://api.kanke365.com/ads/app-tongyong-wk-7.js
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We also found an interesting case when an illicit miner consists of heavily obfuscated code (thus we initially flagged
it only as suspicious after a keyword match). The app actively tries to obtain the administrative permissions from its
users, and contains an encrypted file “assets/5a240bed02ae6”. Upon thorough inspection of the app, we we found
the decryption key and were able to decrypt the file: we realized that the file contains a miner initialization code which
is being decrypted at runtime and dynamically called at via the Dalvik classloader (the main reason why the app needs
the admin privileges).
We have also found that the majority of scam miners in our dataset are obfuscated, probably, to hinder inspection and
to make repackaging more difficult. Thus, it is necessary to perform runtime mining detection, not only in the cases,
when the mining code is not shipped within the Android app and/or is heavily obfuscated, but also to identify scam
miners that do not mine. To achieve dynamic detection, we have developed an approach described in the next section.
5.2 Dynamic Detection
One of the most effective approaches to detect miners is to observe their dynamic behavior. Indeed, in order to gain
maximum profit for the developers, a miner should use all available resources [31]. At the same time, in order to
persist on the device, an illicit miner should conceal its mining activity, e.g., by applying throttling or doing this when
the user does not use the phone.
In this section, we propose an approach and a prototype called BRENNTDROID that leverage machine learning for
detecting the Android miners using dynamic features. In order to build this prototype we selected a dataset consisting
of 200 Android applications: 100 miners and 100 benign apps.
For the miners dataset, we selected 100 apks from our sample that start the mining process immediately after they have
launched. This is a valid assumption because our tool is supposed to constantly monitor applications on a device and,
thus, can detect the moment when an app starts mining. Moreover, dormant miners do not cause damage for the user.
As the benign dataset, we randomly selected 100 apps from the local Google Play store among the “Trending”, “Top
Apps”, and “Top Grossing” application groups. These apps include various categories such as “Gaming”, “Education”,
“Sports” and “Shopping”, and their number of downloads ranged from 100 to more than 500M.
For each of these apps, we collected a set of traces that contain different dynamic parameter values generated by the
corresponding application. We used the Snapdragon Profiler [28] to collect these traces. This is a tool developed
by Qualcomm Technologies to profile execution of an Android app by collecting CPU, GPU, DSP, memory, power,
thermal, and network data in order to find and fix performance issues. We ran each application from our dataset on LG
Nexus 5 powered by the Snapdragon 800 system-on-chip running the Lineage OS 14.1 operating system (based on
Android 7.1), and collected data about the low-level system events. Each application was exercised for 300 seconds.
In a nutshell, each low-level system event is represented by 4 values: Process name, Timestamp, Metric name, and
Metric Value. We consider as a metric timeseries a sequence of the values with the corresponding timestamps that
share the same application and profiled metric. For each application, we collected 15 different metrics: 1) Battery
Current; 2) Battery Power; 3) CPU Branch Misses; 4) CPU Clock; 5) CPU Context Switches; 6) CPU Cycles; 7)
CPU Cycles/Instruction; 8) CPU Instructions; 9) CPU Page Faults; 10) CPU Task Clock; 11) CPU Utilization Percent;
12) Memory Usage; 13) Rx Bytes (Total); 14) Tx Bytes (Total); and 15) Temperature. For each of the timeseries,
we calculated 10 simple statistical values: 1) Minimum (Min); 2) Maximum (Max); 3) Average (Mean); 4) Median
(Median); 5) Unbiased kurtosis (Kurt); 6) Unbiased skew (Skew); 7) Unbiased standard error of the mean (Sem);
8) Standard deviation (Std); 9) Mean absolute deviation (Mad); 10) Coefficient of variation (CV). Thus, for every
application we obtained a feature vector consisting of 150 values.
This amount of features is large, considering the size of our dataset. Therefore, we applied two feature selection
techniques to eliminate excessive variables. It should be mentioned that we used the filtering techniques that perform
cleaning only based on the internal properties of the dataset, without considering its connection to our application
classes. First, we removed the features that have low variance in our dataset (threshold=0.1) using the scikit-learn
library [27]. This operation removed 20 features from our dataset. Second, we eliminated highly correlated features
(Pearson correlation coefficient is more than 0.9). After this procedure, only 67 features were left to be used further
(see Figure 6 for the list).
To detect the strongest features in our dataset28, we exploited the internal property of tree-based algorithms that
calculate feature importances as a part of their training procedure. We trained a Random Forest classifier [27] on our
dataset. Figure 6 lists the extracted features and shows their importance. The first two positions in this figure occupy
28This information can be further used to collect only a subset of strong features on a device.
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Figure 6: Feature importance
the Maximum CPU Utilization % and Average Battery Power features. The corresponding Kernel Density Estimation
(KDE) plots29 are shown in Figures 7a and 7b.
Several observations can be taken from these graphs. First, in Figure 7a, a huge spike around 100% could be observed
for miners. This confirms that miners try to utilize all CPU resources on the device. At the same time, we also see
some spikes around 30% tick. This proves that some miners in our dataset throttled their mining capability, or used a
subset of all available CPU cores.
Second, the Maximum CPU Utilization % KDE for benign applications is almost uniformly distributed along the
X axis. That means that there is no specific pattern of CPU utilization by benign apps. I.e., different applications
consume on average different amount of CPU resources. The more intensive tasks a processor executes, the more
power it requires. During our experiment, the phone collecting the dataset was attached to the computer through a
USB cable. As a side-effect, during the dataset collection the phone was also charging. It can be seen on Figure 7b
that when a benign application is executed the phone was actually charging (the extremum value is on the positive
side). At the same time, the miners were consuming so much energy that the battery was even draining, even though
the phone was attached to a source of energy.
We evaluated our model using the 10-fold stratified cross validation applying the Random Forest classifier [27], using
all our selected features. Figure 8 shows the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve – the dependency between
False Positive (FPR) and True Positive (TPR) Rates. The graph confirms that even with simple statistical dynamic
features, it is possible to detect mining activity with high confidence. Indeed, in our experiment we managed to
achieve 95% of accuracy with the Area Under Curve (AUC) score equal to 0.988±0.009. Our prototype model proves
that it is possible to build a very accurate detection tool working at runtime that is able to detect and block mining
activities on a device.
We admit that collection of dynamic features is connected with large power consumption overheads. This means that
implementation of BRENNTDROID to run on a user device could be impractical. Moreover, the obtained machine
learning model is valid in our testbed and may be not transferable to any device. However, the developed approach
29We omit the rest of the KDE plots due to the space limitations.
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Figure 8: Receiver operating characteristic curve
could be applied during application vetting process [44]. In this case, app stores could inspect an application and use
BRENNTDROID as one of the tests. Indeed, in controlled environment an app could be tested on a particular device,
which a priori has a trained model.
6 Threats to Validity
In this paper we have presented our findings from a large sample of Android cryptominers and proposed an approach
to dynamically detect mining (or verify its absence). These results could be subject to several threats to validity.
The internal validity of the presented results depends upon our interpretation of the collected data and the analysis we
performed. The main source of this threat in our case may be posed by the heuristics we employed to detect miners
among the general population of apps that we have downloaded. To mitigate this threat, we manually checked every
app from the resulting miner sample looking for the evidence of the mining code. We have also ran each app to collect
more evidence that would support the fact that it is indeed mining.
The external validity of our results may be affected by how well they generalize to the entire population of Android
cryptocurrency miners in the wild. We acknowledge that our current sample is skewed towards one big campaign,
and that we have not processed all available Android applications (which is infeasible) looking for the mining code. It
would be interesting to validate our findings working with a large security company that has already privately collected
many mining samples in its networks.
We are aware that there exist three main approaches to hide the presence of mining code and hinder detection: CPU
throttling, payload hiding and mining script obfuscation [16, 10]. We could have failed to identify certain cryptocur-
rency miners among the apps that we have been downloading from Koodous and VirusTotal due to complex obfuscation
and evasion techniques employed by the authors of miners, bugs in the apktool, or the lack of a major popularity of
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miners present at these services. Yet, our main goal was not to capture every miner that is available in the wild, but
to obtain and to study a significantly large sample of real-world Android cryptocurrency miners and to pave possible
directions for detecting them.
7 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work reporting on Android cryptomining applications. Previously,
cryptojacking has been investigated in the context of traditional binary malware [26, 18], and there have been several
papers focusing on browser-based cryptojacking [20, 24, 30, 11, 31, 29].
7.1 Cryptojacking in Other Contexts.
Browser-based cryptojacking. The ease of integration of Coinhive-like services into websites has led to the prolifera-
tion of drive-by cryptomining attacks. Eskandari et al. [11] have applied keyword-based search to the website code on
the PublicWWW database, and have reported finding more than 30K occurrences of the Coinhive library and some oc-
currences of its alternatives, such as Crypto-Loot and JSECoin. Konoth et al. [20] have found 20 active crypto-mining
campaigns and 28 crypto-mining services in Alexa’s Top 1 Million websites. They have used keyword-based search
in web traffic logs, followed by manual analysis. Like in our approach, their keywords included mining services’
names and specific strings pertinent to these services (in the miner initialization code and in the Wasm/asm.js, i.e.,
web assembly, mining payload), Stratum protocol keywords, WebSocket communication. They have also used a high
number of WebWorker threads in a web site as a feature pertinent to mining. Similarly, Musch et al. [24] report that
0.25% websites from Alexa Top 1 Million are serving crypto-mining code. They have applied CPU usage profiling
and presence of web assembly code and several WebWorkers as indicators. Hong et al. [16] have proposed a run-time
mining detection tool CMTracker that integrates hash computation-based and stack structure-based profilers.
Ruth et al. [30] have seeded their mining website dataset from the NoCoin list [17] and have proposed a fingerprinting
technique for Wasm code. Rauchberger et al. [29] have proposed the MiningHunter technique to detect browser-based
miners by analysing Web logs.
Saad, Khormali and Mohaisen [31] have used public services (Pixalate and Netlab 360) to acquire a list of websites
with mining code embedded. Using these sites as ground truth, they have developed dynamic mining script profiles
with respect to CPU usage, battery drain and network usage. Machine learning-based approach to browser-based
miner detection has also been outlined in Carlin et al. [4], where opcode traces have been used as features, and in
Draghicescu et al. [9], where the CPU allocation features and the threads and socket connections have been captured.
Inlined reference monitoring for Web cryptojackers have been proposed by Wang et al. [38].
Binary-based cryptojacking. Malicious Bitcoin cryptominers have been investigated by Huang et al. [18] already in
2014. Division into campaigns and profits generated by the recent binary-based cryptominers have been analysed by
Pastrana and Suarez-Tangil [26]. The data collection approach used in [26] is similar to ours, as the authors crawled
public services for malicious samples and then applied static and dynamic analysis heuristics to select only miners.
In contrast to the aforementioned works related to browser-based and binary-based cryptojacking, ours focuses on
the mining applications in the Android ecosystem. Our results show that the Android platform is affected by both
Web-based and binary cryptojackers. Yet, we collected and analyzed not only malicious cryptominers, as in [26], but
also bona fide miners that some users might want to explore. We have also reported about the phenomenon of scam
miners, that only pretend to be mining cryptocurrencies, while, at best, only serving ads to the users.
To the best of our knowledge, the SophosLabs report on mining Android apps [34] is the only paper analyzing Android
mining malware and providing some samples. We have used this report to seed our miner dataset, as it only mentions
a few samples hashes (not all samples were obtainable through our main app sources, VirusTotal and Koodous, and
available application markets or the app database AndroZoo [1]).
7.1.1 Energy and CPU Consumption Evaluation.
Recently, Clay et al. [6] have evaluated the CPU consumption required for mining on Android devices. As mentioned,
Saad, Khormali and Mohaisen [31] reported on using CPU usage and battery level on several devices, including an
Android phone, to discriminate mining web scripts from non-mining ones (that were emulated with JavaScript disabled
in the browser). The authors reported that mining scripts have had significant impact on the CPU and battery (at least
40% of CPU usage on Android with low throttle and higher rate of battery charge consumption.
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Our dynamic detection approach relies on evaluation of many dynamically profiled features of Android applications,
including CPU usage and battery drain caused by computation-intensive mining code. In contrast to [31, 4], our
solution for dynamic miner detection is based on comparison of mining apps with benign but fully functional ones.
Several approaches for detecting Android malware based on energy consumption fingerprints have been proposed and
evaluated, e.g., [23, 15, 3, 5, 13]. Yet, these works focused on detection of malware behaviors other than mining.
7.1.2 Android malware detection.
As our analysis of VirusTotal results and security industry reports show [10], mining functionality can be delivered
as a part of malicious payload. There exist a large body of work that focuses on Android malware detection, e.g.,
[19, 2, 14, 42, 39, 41, 45, 36], to name just a few. Particularly, the cross-language Dual-Force technique [35] has a big
potential for Web-based miner detection.
8 Conclusions
Cryptojacking poses a serious threat to mobile devices. At best, illicit cryptocurrency miners deplete the battery of
mobile devices fast. However, they may cause more serious damage: from monetary loss to physical harm to the
device’s owner due to overheating. In order to better comprehend this threat, we collected a dataset of 728 Android
mining apps, and dissected them. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that looks into cryptojacking
applications on Android. Our analysis confirms the public knowledge in this area is largely insufficient. For example,
we found 173 illicit miners from 76 mining campaigns that have been not previously reported.
In addition, we performed the analysis of the miners from our sample with VirusTotal. Our findings are very interesting:
16 miners from our dataset are not detected by any antivirus engine, and a single miner has been detected by at most 39
out of the total of 74 scanners available at VirusTotal, meaning that there is no consistency among the scanner engines.
With the clean dataset available, we performed a dynamic analysis of the miners and compared the results with benign
applications. We identified a set of dynamic metrics that contribute the most to the accurate classification results.
Indeed, based on our dataset, we managed to achieve 95% of accuracy with the AUC score of whoping 0.988±0.009,
according to the 10-fold cross validation. Based on our findings, we proposed a tool called BRENNTDROID that can
be used to detect miners at runtime.
For the future work, we plan to extend our dataset with more illicit cryptocurrency miners that use heavy code obfus-
cation and to study them. We also plan to extend BRENNTDROID with reliable techniques that account for various
static and dynamic evasion methods such as network traffic obfuscation, CPU throttling, and evading user interaction
(e.g., mining only when a user does not interact with a device, or at night).
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